09 January 2007

Rhetoric and Philosophy

The last few days I've been rather amiss in blogging. I've been heavily immersed in research and just haven't had much time to write. Happily, however, I received a call for an on-campus interview today. Hopefully it won't be the last such call.

In a rather pointed post, Kenneth Rufo responds to one of my queries as to how it is possible to be influenced. Kenneth quotes me from my Forcing the Event entry, where I write,
I think this really gets to the core of the issue. To put it in Kantian terms: "What are the conditions for the possibility of being influenced." I've seen some work done among the systems theory that's promising in that it analyzes the manner in which systems are selectively open to their environment, but the problem here, I think, is that there's a tendency among systems theorists to place too much emphasis on the agency and autonomy of the system to the detriment of the environment. In many instances I did not explicitly choose my own influences, yet I wasn't simply a passive formation of pre-existent influences either.
To this Kenneth responds,
You know, there is a field that actually spends a fair amount of time on this exact question: rhetoric. It's got a long tradition, it precedes philosophy, and there's a subfield that deals with social movements, though I can't speak to the quality of that scholarship. For particular people you might enjoy, I suppose I'm obligated to suggest Kenneth Burke, though he's hardly my cup of tea. I'd also recommend a few contemporary scholars: Celeste Condit (she's done some ideographic studies of abortion, genetics, and a few other topics), Barb Biesecker (articles more than book, though her Addressing Postmodernity is pretty good), Michael Hyde (more of an ethical, Levinas/Heidegger influenced version of rhetoric), John Durham Peters (his Speaking Into the Air is masterful), and Christine Harold (who's book OurSpace comes out in April). I can be more specific if you have a particular example of symbolic structuration you're grappling with, or if you can clarify what such a structuration might be in practice. Not that rhetoricians have any particularly final answer, but it might be useful to look at the stuff. As for the dialectical arrangement you're alluding to, I'd at least advocate some engagement with Bourdieu, since his theory of structuration is predicated on a conception of agency as a dialectic between habitus and agent.
I think, perhaps, Kenneth here misses the focus of my original question and elides two distinct concepts: The concept of influence and the concept of persuasion. While these two concepts are interrelated, they are nonetheless distinct and respond to different issues. It is impossible for me to be persuaded without being influenced, however, I can quite easily be influenced without it being a matter of persuasion. What is at issue here are questions about the selective openness of organizations to the world. That is, an organization, whether it be a biological organism, a subject, a social system, etc., is only selectively open to the world and thus can only be selectively influenced. For instance, I am unable to perceive ultra-violet light.

As I see it, one of the central assumptions of vulger historicist approaches is the idea that we are unilaterially conditioned by an environment. That is, the idea is that we're born in an environment and somehow this environment makes us what we are. This view is common, for instance, to both Foucault and Bourdieu. What this account of individuation misses is the way in which subjects are only selectively open to an environment such that there's a way in which we always choose our cultural and historical influences. Zizek expresses this point brilliantly in Tarrying With the Negative through the lense of Hegel's "doctrine of essence" in the science of logic. There Zizek writes that,
Another way to exemplify this logic of 'positing the presuppositions' is the spontaneous ideological narrativization of our experience and activity: whatever we do, we always situate it in a larger symbolic context which is charged with conferring meaning upon our acts. A Serbian fighting Muslim Albanians and Bosnians in today's ex-Yugoslavia conceives of his fight as the last act in the centuries-old defense of Christian Europe against Turkish penetration; the Bolsheviks conceived of the October Revolution as the continuation and successful conclusion of all previous radical popular uprisings, from Sparticus in ancient Rome to Jacobins in the French Revolution (this narrativization is tacitly assumed even by some critics of Bolshevism who, for example, speak of the 'Stalinist Thermidor'); the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea or the Sendero Luminoso in Perud conceive of their movement as a return to the old glory of an ancient empire (Inca's empire in Peru, the old Khmer kingdom in Cambodia); etc. The Hegelian point to be made is that such narratives are always retroactive reconstructions for which we are in a way responsible; they are never simple given facts: we can never refer to them as a found condition, context, or presupposition of our activity. Precisely as presuppositions, such narratives are always-already 'posited' by us. Tradition is tradition insofar as we constitute it as such. (126-7)
The point here is subtle but important: The subject is never simply a product of history or the result of conditioning, but rather posits those conditions through which it might be influenced and constitute itself. Or, where the writing of history is concerned, there is always an invisible subject-- invisible insofar as there is no signifier for the subject --that posits x as history. Along these lines, my dear friend Melanie enjoys poking fun at me for my psychoanalytic narratives here on Larval Subjects, as she sees something false or contrived in the way I narrate myself. Here she is absolutely correct in that I often portray myself as a product of the events I narrate, as a sort of emergence, rather than as positing these events myself as a way of producing my presents. Indeed, my narratives are a sort of buffoonery. Sadly I haven't yet developed the literary talent of Lars in his narrative conventions. Whatever the case may be, the Lacanian subject is a void, a lack, that animates the signifying chain. In short, the Lacano-Hegelian subject is-- unlike the historicists --never simply a product of conditioning individuation such that it could be reduced to being a historically determined subject position. The question is one of how this lack, this nothingness, this absence of any successful identification, is handled and lived.

Zizek makes this point well apropos Hegel's discussion of identity in the science of logic. Quoting Hegel, Zizek writes,
Father is the other of son, and son the other of father, and each only is as this other of the other; and at the same time, the one determination only is, in relation to the other... The father also has an existence of his own apart from the son-relationship; but then he is not father but simply man... Opposites, therefore, contain contradiction in so far as they are, in the same respect, negatively related to one another or sublate each other and are indifferent to one another. (SL 441)
The inattentive reader may easily miss the key accent of this passage, the feature which belies the standard notion of the 'Hegelian Contradiction': 'contradition' does not take place between 'father' and 'son' (here, we have a case of simple opposition between two codependent terms); it also does not turn on the fact that in one relation (to my son) I am 'father' and in another (to my own father) I am myself 'son,' i.e., I am 'simultaneously father and son.' If this were the Hegelian 'contradiction,' Hegel would effectively be guilty of logical confusion, since it is clear that I am not both in the same respect. The last phrase in the quoted passage from Hegel's Logic locates the contradiction clearly inside 'father' himself: 'contradiction' designates the antagonistic relationship between what I am 'for the others'-- my symbolic determination --and what I am 'in myself,' abstractedly from my relations to others. It is the contradiction between the void of the subject's pure 'being-for-himself' and the signifying feature which represents him for the others, in Lacanian terms: between $ and S1. More precisely, 'contradiction' means that it is my very 'alienation' in the symbolic mandate, in S1, which retoractively makes $-- the void which eludes the hold of the mandate-- out of my brute reality: I am not only 'father,' not only this particular determination, yet beyond these symbolic mandates I am nothing but the void which eludes them (and, as such their own retroactive product). (130-1)
This, then, is one of the meanings of Lacan's discourse of the master:

S1--->S2
--
$

When Lacan remarks that "the signifier represents the subject for another signifier" it must be understood that the subject as such never appears in the signifier or that the subject is always effaced by the signifier. That is, when the subject falls under the signifier it suffers an aphanisis or disappearance, which is why Lacan will claim, in "Position of the Unconscious" that the subject is a temporal pulsation that disappears the moment that it appears and that can only be tracked through the traces it leaves (traces in symptoms, bungled actions, dreams, slips of the tongue, etc). These formations of the unconscious, in effect, are attempts to fill the void that is the subject, to produce a signifier that would be adequate to that void once and for all or that would be capable of naming it. However, this void is ineradicable (i.e., it's a constitutive result of the individual's subordination to the signifier). As Lacan will write, "For what the unconscious does is to show us the gap through which neurosis recreates a harmony with the real-- a real that may well not be determined" (Seminar XI, 22). There is always one signifier too few and it is for this reason that there is no subject without a symptom (Seminar 22: RSI).

It is here that Lacan differs most radically from the postmoderns. Where the general trend of theory today is to reduce the subject to power, history, language, subject-positions, etc., Lacan demonstrates that between symbolic identity and the subject there is always a gap. The "cash-value" of this move is immense-- On the one hand, Lacan is able to answer the question of why the subject is led to identify in the first place. As Freud had already argued well before Lacan, the ego dimension of the subject (which is always a misrecognition) is the precipitate of identifications. But what is it that motivates these identifications? Lacan's answer is that my flight to the Other, to the signifiers of the Other, is the attempt to fill my "want-to-be" through identification. I look to the Other to tell me what I am. However, just as the central hole in a torus can never be filled, every identification is ultimately a failed identification (which is yet another reason that the formation of symptoms such as the symptom of the "Jew" for the German nationalist) as the hole insists and subverts the identification. As a result, there is always a kernal of resistance to any field of identification. The aim of the cultural critic should therefore be to lay bare these tensions, these antagonisms, so as effect a change in the symptom and how the symptom is organized. From the historicist standpoint this would be impossible as historicism is essentially Leibnizian: "Everything has a reason!" What it is unable to think is the kernal of contingency, of non-being, at the heart of any positive formation. The question here becomes one of devising technologies to shift the symbolic coordinates of narrative fields of identification so that antagonism as such might become thinkable.

None of this, of course, is to deny Kenneth's observations about the importance of rhetoric. I work closely with rhetoric and with rhetoricians-- at my school they're my primary interlocutors. In my view, the central insight of the rhetoric tradition is that the subject is inherently intersubjective... Which is to say, the subject is constituted in the field of the Other. Even if poorly executed, this is part of Zizek's own brilliance. On the one hand, Zizek has recognized the central importance of Lacan in giving us a truly rigorous intersubjective conception of the subject that thoroughly breaks with the tradition of seeing the questions of philosophy posed strictly in terms of subject-object relations. The minimal dyad is a triad: not subject-object, but rather subject-Other-object. No one has gone further than Lacan in thinking through the manner in which the subject's desire, all its object relations, it's very being in the world is thoroughly caught up in relations to the Other. This insight was glimpsed in philosophy beginning with the progressive shift towards language, history, and power in philosophy-- all of which led to a philosophical crisis surrounding questions of presence --but it is with Lacan that this topology is thoroughly elaborated. On the other hand, Zizek has clearly seen that only something like Hegelian dialectic-- beginning with the lord/bondsman dialectic in the genesis of self-consciousness --is successful in escaping the metaphysics of presence insofar as it conceives the subject's relation to the world and the Other in terms of self-relating negativity capable of discerning itself in difference itself. This is a project that needs to be worked out far more thoroughly and rigorously. It is to the credit of the rhetoricians that they recognized from the beginning that questions of epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, ethics, etc., were questions of intersubjectivity and relations to the Other, such that any posing of these questions in restricted subject-object terms were bound to be truncated and mutilated.

However, where Kenneth's remarks seem to suggest an opposition between rhetoric and philosophy, I would prefer to see something like a Lacanian real or parallax. As Zizek describes it,
The key problem here is that the basic 'law' of dialectical materialism, the struggle of opposites, was colonized/obfuscated by the New Age notion of the polarity of opposites (ying-yang, and so on). The first critical move is to replace this topic of the polarity of opposites with the concept of the inherent 'tension,' gap, noncoincidence, of the One with itself. This... is based on a strategic politico-philosophical decision to designate this gap which separates the One from itself with the term parallax. [already extensively thematized in the brilliant For They Know Not What They Do..., that no one bothers to read]. There is an entire series of the modes of parallax in different domains of modern theory: quantum physics (the wave-particle duality); the parallax of neurobiology (the realization that, when we look behind the face into the skull, we find nothing: 'there's no one at home' there, just piles of gray matter-- it is difficult to tarry with this gap between meaning and the pure Real); the parallax of ontological difference, of the discord between the ontic and the transcendental-ontological (we cannot reduce the ontological horizon to its ontic 'roots,' but neither can we deduce the ontic domain from the ontological horizon; that is to say, transcendental constitution is not creation); the parallax of the Real (the Lacanian real has no positive-substantial consistency, it is just the gap between the multitude of perspectives on it)... (7)
And so on. And to this I add the parallax of language between rhetoric and philosophy, or language in its address to an-Other where I can use the truth to tell a lie-- WIFE: "Were you out with that redhead at the bar lastnight?" HUSBAND: [Sarcastically] "Of course darling, and after we rented a hotel room and had sex that's illegal in 42 states all night long." WIFE: "Sorry, I just thought I smelled perfume on you and my imagination got away with me." --and language in its demonstrative and referential function to the world. The key point, of course, is that we are not to choose one or the other horns of the parallax but are rather to think them in their very gap, in their very heterogenoues irreducibility to one another. My rhetorician colleagues always express a sort of bitterness and hostility towards philosophy (no doubt they're still angry over Plato banishing them from the Republic), and philosophers, of course, express a disdain for rhetoric, as can be witnessed in the solipsistic rigor of texts such as Descartes' Meditations, Hegel's Logic, or Husserl's Ideas, where a palpable negation of the Other (as reader) seems to take place in the deductive meditations. Likewise, the rhetor often seems to reject questions of Truth. Indeed, today it increasingly seems that the most audacious and unforgivable thing one can do is proclaim a Truth. There is a veritable prohibition against Truth. Yet if the subject is constituted in the field of the Other, if the subject is an effect of the signifier in the real of the biological body, then there can be no question of choosing between rhetoric or philosophy. Rather, there can be no worldly statement that doesn't already make reference to both the Other and the other, no demonstrative statement that is a solipsistic intellectual reverie. Rather, it's high time that the parallax gap, the central antagonism motivating this inaugural division of disciplines and practices, be thought in its own right.

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20 Comments:

Anonymous Kenneth Rufo said...

Wow. While I appreciate such a long post as a response to my comment, I'm afraid I hardly recognize myself in your characterization. I never collapsed influence and persuasion (though these days, persuasion is a fairly outmoded concept in rhetorical theory), and I never suggested an opposition between rhetoric and philosophy. Precession is a temporal arrangement, not an ontological exclusion, so when I said that rhetoric precedes philosophy, I was simply stating the obvious. But I suppose perhaps I should just swallow your response, since given your own contentions regarding the gap between you and others and the constitution of the world around you to which you respond as the means of manifesting your own present, your extrapolation of my comment must have been somehow productive for you. Not necessarily productive for me, but then again, when you say that "No one has gone further than Lacan in thinking through the manner in which the subject's desire, all its object relations, it's very being in the world is thoroughly caught up in relations to the Other," maybe you mean, given the gap and constitution of the world you speak of elsewhere, "relations to the Other constituted by the subject as a means of engaging the chasm between subject and other." Maybe, but then I'm hard pressed to think of Lacan as the front-runner here for thinking about the relation to the other, as Levinas seems to go much further.

And I don't mean to be snide here, but I think you're far closer to Bourdieu than you'd care to admit, though there's obviously some vocabulary games that carve out distinctions in perspective, even if the functions of those perspectives seem to me in close proximity. Suffice it to say, that while I no longer use Bourdieu in my own work, I think it markedly inaccurate to describe him as a vulgar historicist, though I can understand more the desire to dismiss Foucault as such. Still, given the nuance and attention you lavish on Lacan, Hegel, and Zizek, it's a shame to make such a thrifty dismissal of Bourdieu.

I also think it's worth suggesting that this confluence of the irreducible gap and "positing the presuppositions" is a perfection and a expository closure that limits the inquiry into questions of influence and symbolic structuration, though it may very much help to explain the manner in which the subject structures the world around themself.

January 10, 2007 3:03 AM  
Blogger Sinthome said...

Thanks for responding, Kenneth. I think I took the tone of your original post as symtomatically reflecting the classical divide between philosophy and rhetoric, as you seemed to be imputing an ignorance and dismissal of rhetoric to me, thereby repeating an indictment of philosophy that I often hear at rhetoric conferences and from my rhetorician friends.

Perhaps you could say a bit more as to where you see a convergence between things I'm up to and Bourdieu, as you've simply referenced without explicating. I am not, of course, suggesting that there aren't such convergences. I enjoyed both The Logic of Practice and Pascalian Meditations and there are a few posts on this blog that are devoted to Bourdieu. My major objection is that Bourdieu seems to conceive the subject as emerging from a conditioning field, whereas the Lacanian take would be that the subject is never quite at home in its world, that it always stands at a certain distance to its world.

I'd also be interested in hearing more as to how you see Levinas going further with regard to the Other. On the one hand, when I read Levinas' descriptions of the encounter with the Other they sound almost identical to the obsessional stance with regard to the Other and the ideal that emerges consequent of that of "oblative love", where the obsessional tries to reduce the enigmatic desire of the Other to demand so as to satisfy all the demands issuing from the Other and thereby forestall any further encounter with the anxiety producing desire of the Other. Moreover, I don't find the elaborate account of how the subject is precipitated in the field of the Other in Levinas, though he does make a few vague nods in this direction in Totality and Infinity when discussing the ipseity of the I. I think this is probably an inherent limitation of his phenomenological approach.

January 10, 2007 10:58 AM  
Anonymous Kenneth Rufo said...

Well, Levinas largely steps beyond the phenomenological approach in Otherwise than Being, the book that follows Totality and Infinity, and spends much more time explicating the function of language as the means of the encounter with the Other. Though even encounter with the Other is a rather poor phrasing, since it remains for Levinas the Other as such that makes possible the call that makes known an encounter. I don't see this is as a dismissal of anxiety in quite the same way you do, as I think Levinas is making an argument about what makes something like ontology possible and you're talking about the mechanics of the ontological as such, so I think the two are on different playing fields - which isn't to say they'd play on the same team if they were both stepping on the same grass, but is a reason why I find it unlikely that Lacan necessarily excludes or occludes Levinas.

The idea of an oblative love as a reduction is, I think, a somewhat Zizekian formulation, and based on a rather reductive reading. Check out, in particular "Notes on Meaning," in which Levinas writes:

"It is not a question of seeing or knowing. We are asking whether the humanity of man is defined only by that which man is, or whether in the face that asks for me a meaning other, and older, than the ontological one is in the process of becoming meaningful and awaking us to another thought than that of knowledge, which is probably only the very pulsation of the I of good conscience."

Or alternately, in "The Meaning of Meaning:"

Face or non-autochthony. The consciousness of that inassimilable strangeness of the other, the bad conscience of my responsibility, the bad conscience of that difference of the non-additive other, and of that non-in-difference-for-the-other-in-me - that is no doubt the very meaning of the face, its original speech. In it there can be heard the demand that keeps me in question and elicits my response or my responsibility. Before all perseverance in being and repose in the self, it is, in the identity of the self, the for-the-other that sobers up its identity - and never stops doing so - awakening it to the psychism of thought."

Anyway, suffice it to say that his approach does not remain categorically phenomenological for very long.

As for my tone, I can only apologize for it. I cannot account for its being there, and I am not sure who or what generated it, but if it led to some dispute where none need existed, then by all means consider it a mistake on my part. I neither endorse any classical break between rhetoric and philosophy (much of my own work touches on the mechanics by which this split takes place, which I believe has more to do with technics than with truth, but that's just me). But I did find it odd that given the particular content of the post to which I responded that, in an effort to think through symbolic structuration you weren't engaging more fully with rhetoricians who spend much of their time examining that particular phenomenon. Given the other comments, and the high value that was placed on the need to understand these conditions of influential possibility, I thought it worth mentioning some folks who might assits (not decide) whatever determinations you are pursuing.

As for Bourdieu, let me say two things. First, whatever the convergences, I still think it's silly to label him a vulgar historicist. I also think it's silly to label people vulgar Marxists or vulgar textualists or whatever, but in Bourdieu's case and the historicist label, it's simply not true that Bourdieu sees the subject as being overly or entirely conditioned by historical circumstance, though obviously this notion - "structure" does play an important role in Bourdieu's analysis, but it is only one component of the dialectic that defines the subject for Bourdieu, the other being agency. The habitus, the set of "structuring structures" that appear as "predispositions" typically interacts with the field, "a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions", but the interaction is one that Bourdieu describes as a struggle, and the struggle is in turn described as being largely about symbolic recognition: in other words, agents can manipulate the field by working to change the representations or symbolic structures that help structure habitus.

Second, as to the question of convergence, let me start by saying that for Bourdieu, you are correct in thinking he will not be keen on the idea that people are never quite at home. Bourdieu is far more likely to think that people "misrecognize" themselves as being at home, and that this is precisely what determines the viability of their habitus. Maybe this is the same thing as you're saying of Lacan; maybe it's the opposite (it depends on where and when the valence is extracted). But when you say that Bourdieu believes the subject emerges from a conditioning field, "whereas" Lacan says the subject is never at home, well those aren't oppositional. I'm not even sure there's a tension in that particular contrast. The presuppositions supposed by the subject as the backdrop of their actions may be produced by the subject but they are not produced ex nihilo, and you've even talked about this in different ways in previous posts. Bourdieu is simply trying to provide a vocabulary by which to understand how certain structuring structures make possible certain "predispostions" that are then posited as presuppositions. Lacan and Bourdieu have some clear disagreements on the nature of the psyche, to be sure, but then they have radically different disciplinary commitments, and a lot of their disagreements often seem more like boundary work than anything like mutual exclusivity.

January 10, 2007 12:02 PM  
Blogger Sinthome said...

Great comments, Kenneth. I don't have much more to add. I haven't come across the "oblative love" criticism anywhere in Zizek, whose discussions of Levinas I tend to find highly reductive and unfair, though I'm sympathetic to his desire to avoid the theological turn that Levinas seems to invite.

When, in the second quote, Levinas speaks of an evocation of responsibility that never ceases doing so, this rings identically in my ears as the obsessional relation to the Other that is responded to with an infinite labor of striving to respond to that call (like the antics of the Rat Man trying to pay of his debt for the glasses when he doesn't even own the money). This, I take it, would be the meaning of obsessional fantasy as Lacan writes it in seminar 8: -A- <> phi(a, a', a'', a'''...) which is to be read as the manner in which the obsessional relates to the barred Other (the enigmatic Other on high in Levinas) and the imaginary castration he experiences in relation to this Other and which he responds to by trying to fill it with an infinite series of "a's". The obsessional, of course, is also prone to developing elaborate theoretical frameworks around his symptoms, which isn't to suggest that these theories are false, but it's certainly intriguing for the Lacanian to observe the manner in which Levinas develops an entire body of work around this traumatic encounter with the Other.

January 10, 2007 12:25 PM  
Anonymous Kenneth Rufo said...

Fair enough, but to the Levinasian (*grin*), it's fascinating how far a Lacanian will go to erect analytical precepts that help ward off and resist the call of the Other. It is for Levinas a classic example of the knowing analyst/critic imposing knowledge on a relation that comes before and exceeds the very possibility of knowledge. Hence the two playing fields :)

I suppose the more productive encounter would be with Seminar VII, but even then I'm not sure they're talking out the same "subject" in any literal sense.

January 10, 2007 12:36 PM  
Blogger Sinthome said...

I think you really hit on something here with your inversion of my "from a Lacanian perspective":

"Fair enough, but to the Levinasian (*grin*), it's fascinating how far a Lacanian will go to erect analytical precepts that help ward off and resist the call of the Other. It is for Levinas a classic example of the knowing analyst/critic imposing knowledge on a relation that comes before and exceeds the very possibility of knowledge. Hence the two playing fields :)"

Initially there might seem to be something undecidable here. However, for me the issue is decided on empirical grounds. First, the Lacanian agrees with you that the very possibility of knowledge requires a prior situatedness in the Other, as there is no subject prior to the relation to the Other.

Second, the empirical point emerges with regard to the question of whether the Other is operative in all cases of subjectivity. Here the clear answer (for the Lacanian, you may disagree) is no. Psychosis would be that instance of a subject not situated in the field of the Other, and therefore only capable of relating to others (semblables). The question then becomes that of just why the psychotic is different or how the psychotic came to be. It is this ability to give what I cautiously refer to as genetic accounts of these various forms of subjectivity (no reference to DNA intended, only "genesis" or "development")-- the phenomenology of the hysteric or the pervert would be vastly different than that of the obsessional which I've suggested characterizes Levinas, for instance --that I find most convincing in the Lacanian approach. This leads me to believe that while Levinas' descriptions point to something genuine with respect to a particular structure of subjectivity, his tendencies towards the theological and reification of these structures is a sort of mystification.

Of course, there are other Lacanians that might see things differently. As you probably know, an anthology of essays was released a few years ago charting convergences between Levinas and Lacan. Eric Santner's work resonates nicely with Levinas via the influence of Rosenzweig, though even there he takes what I am loosely and cautiously calling a "genetic approach" via the radical psychoanalysis of Laplanche. And more recently David Metzger has shifted from Lacan to Levinas, i.e., he still wants to give a naturalistic/materialistic account of how the Other intervenes in our experience during development. Clearly there's something here and Zizek's extreme reactions to all things Levinasian is a bit symptomatic.

January 10, 2007 1:05 PM  
Anonymous Jodi said...

congrats on the interview!

January 11, 2007 8:42 AM  
Blogger shaimee11 said...

管道离心泵
管道离心泵

January 25, 2007 6:49 AM  
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