Against Theory
Over at Acephalous, Scott has written a piece on why he d
oesn't do theory. I have heard remarks like these from a number of quarters-- though usually made by people from a certain reactionary contingent in English departments that resents having to be aware of theory (in contrast to these reactionaries, English departments deserve a good deal of credit for preserving what's left of continental thought in the United States, where philosophy departments largely dropped the ball) --and find myself thoroughly perplexed whenever I hear them. From a Kantian or Luhmannian point of view, every person observes the world from the perspective of a particular frame and based on a particular set of distinctions. As the Anglo-American philosophers who trained me used to say, "all observation is theory laden", and every judgment about a state of affairs in the world already presupposes a particular theory of how the world is. If I conclude that my partner is possessed because she is speaking in tongues, frothing at the mouth, and seeing things that I cannot see, my judgment presupposes a theory of the nature of the world, of the "ontological furniture" of reality (that it includes things such as demons, devils, souls that can be possessed, etc), and of how that reality is (that these spirits are concerned about human existence; there not being, as Epicurus famously pointed out, any a priori reason to believe the God(s) are concerned with the doings of humans at all). Such theory laden observation is unavoidable. When I view my partner behaving in this way, I conclude something quite different: that she is having a seizure, that perhaps she has a psychosis, etc. So what could it possibly mean to "not do theory"? Isn't the claim that "one does not do theory" simply equivalent to arguing that one does not make the premises of their own theoretical universe explicit or meditate on their own theoretical assumptions about the world? How is it possible to read texts, analyze the world about us, etc., without implicitly employing a theoretical frame of some sort? In approaching any text, do I not already make an entire host of assumptions as to what a text is, what meaning is, what interpretation is, etc? I most often hear these sorts of remarks coming from those who advocate some sort of historicism. However, isn't historicism an ontological theory of what makes things-- texts, peoples, scientific disciplines --what they are? Doesn't the historicist proceed on the theory that for anything that is or has taken place, for any situation, it's being can be exhaustively explained by its historical context as an emergent product of that context? Deleuze and Badiou's ontologies could thus be seen as militantly rejecting this [Foucaultian/Gadamerian] hypothesis.
Wouldn't it be more accurate [and honest] to say "I don't do a particular type of theory?" Approaching this question from the standpoint of the play of the signifier [the unconscious being structured like a language], I suspect that at the level of the unconscious the signifier "theory" is functioning a bit like it does for creationist fundamentalists in the American evolution debate, when it is declared that "Students should understand that evolution is a theory and not fact". Whenever it is declared that one doesn't do theory-- usually by "hard nosed positivists", historicists, or pragamatists --it seems to me that lurking in the background is the thesis that theory is somehow the "unproven" or undemonstrated, whereas the good historicist or positivist is just dealing with hard-nosed historical facts or sense-data. In short, the Quinean point that facts are functions of theories and theories are functions of facts (in endless feedback loops) is ignored, and the person rejects "mere theory" with an air of superiority (that I would call reflexive blindness).
Three questions then:
1) What is meant by theory when someone says "I don't do theory"?
2) Is it possible to not do theory and what does such an activity look like?
3) What desire animates the desire not to do theory? Isn't the desire to "not do theory" a figure of reaction? Isn't it precisely theory that allows us to begin escaping the constraints of our historical and ideological situation?
Have at it!
oesn't do theory. I have heard remarks like these from a number of quarters-- though usually made by people from a certain reactionary contingent in English departments that resents having to be aware of theory (in contrast to these reactionaries, English departments deserve a good deal of credit for preserving what's left of continental thought in the United States, where philosophy departments largely dropped the ball) --and find myself thoroughly perplexed whenever I hear them. From a Kantian or Luhmannian point of view, every person observes the world from the perspective of a particular frame and based on a particular set of distinctions. As the Anglo-American philosophers who trained me used to say, "all observation is theory laden", and every judgment about a state of affairs in the world already presupposes a particular theory of how the world is. If I conclude that my partner is possessed because she is speaking in tongues, frothing at the mouth, and seeing things that I cannot see, my judgment presupposes a theory of the nature of the world, of the "ontological furniture" of reality (that it includes things such as demons, devils, souls that can be possessed, etc), and of how that reality is (that these spirits are concerned about human existence; there not being, as Epicurus famously pointed out, any a priori reason to believe the God(s) are concerned with the doings of humans at all). Such theory laden observation is unavoidable. When I view my partner behaving in this way, I conclude something quite different: that she is having a seizure, that perhaps she has a psychosis, etc. So what could it possibly mean to "not do theory"? Isn't the claim that "one does not do theory" simply equivalent to arguing that one does not make the premises of their own theoretical universe explicit or meditate on their own theoretical assumptions about the world? How is it possible to read texts, analyze the world about us, etc., without implicitly employing a theoretical frame of some sort? In approaching any text, do I not already make an entire host of assumptions as to what a text is, what meaning is, what interpretation is, etc? I most often hear these sorts of remarks coming from those who advocate some sort of historicism. However, isn't historicism an ontological theory of what makes things-- texts, peoples, scientific disciplines --what they are? Doesn't the historicist proceed on the theory that for anything that is or has taken place, for any situation, it's being can be exhaustively explained by its historical context as an emergent product of that context? Deleuze and Badiou's ontologies could thus be seen as militantly rejecting this [Foucaultian/Gadamerian] hypothesis.Wouldn't it be more accurate [and honest] to say "I don't do a particular type of theory?" Approaching this question from the standpoint of the play of the signifier [the unconscious being structured like a language], I suspect that at the level of the unconscious the signifier "theory" is functioning a bit like it does for creationist fundamentalists in the American evolution debate, when it is declared that "Students should understand that evolution is a theory and not fact". Whenever it is declared that one doesn't do theory-- usually by "hard nosed positivists", historicists, or pragamatists --it seems to me that lurking in the background is the thesis that theory is somehow the "unproven" or undemonstrated, whereas the good historicist or positivist is just dealing with hard-nosed historical facts or sense-data. In short, the Quinean point that facts are functions of theories and theories are functions of facts (in endless feedback loops) is ignored, and the person rejects "mere theory" with an air of superiority (that I would call reflexive blindness).
Three questions then:
1) What is meant by theory when someone says "I don't do theory"?
2) Is it possible to not do theory and what does such an activity look like?
3) What desire animates the desire not to do theory? Isn't the desire to "not do theory" a figure of reaction? Isn't it precisely theory that allows us to begin escaping the constraints of our historical and ideological situation?
Have at it!
posted by Sinthome at 7:59 AM
13 Comments:
1) What is meant by theory when someone says "I don't do theory"?
The theorists under discussion are boring.
2) Is it possible to not do theory and what does such an activity look like?
Yes, it looks like unconscious activity. Since most work (in the West) now is mental, the implications of this is kind of scary.
3) What desire animates the desire not to do theory? Isn't the desire to "not do theory" a figure of reaction? Isn't it precisely theory that allows us to begin escaping the constraints of our historical and ideological situation?
The desire to avoid work. Actually, the desire to be entertained, to consume culture.
* * * * *
There is a fine line between deconstructing a work and reflecting on one's experience to a cultural work. The 2nd is unconscious, everyone has an opinion, a reaction.
But theory has some responsibility in all this - there is always jargon, name dropping/shortcuts, bad writing, deadend speculations, just as in all scientific endeavors.
It's the difference between biology students involved in research and pre-med students. One is interested in how things operate and how to change them, the others have an instrumentalist attitude on how to manipulate what already is known.
"Yes, it looks like unconscious activity. Since most work (in the West) now is mental, the implications of this is kind of scary."
Great point! I understand that theory can get into a lot of naval gazing that comes to be divorced from practice and action. The Althusserians used to get this a lot, as it was easy to see that there was often a greater love of the theory than militant political struggle. As such, there's a valid criticism to be made.
However, it also seems to me that "a-theorism" has given us the sorry state of psychological clinical practice today, where therapists functions as new age gurus and masters, and reduce all symptoms to illness (rather than solutions) and see them as "brain lesions" treatable only by medication. It is also a-theorism that has given us American social sciences based almost entirely on quantitative, statistical methods ("we're just observin' the measurable facts, ma'am"). And finally, it is a-theorism that has given us a dominant political praxis (the party system) that still sees everything in terms of nation-states and representation. Bleck!
Thanks Scott... I wasn't trying to dress you down (too much) as I got your point about deconstruction and Derrida. I've been hearing something along these lines a good deal lately, and wonder whether it refers to what you're talking about. One question that occurs to me is that of why one would choose the charged term "theory" at all, rather than simply referring to the figures one rejects. I suspect that shorthand as it is, it still functions linguistically and rhetorically as a sort of "enthymeme" suggesting a position that is "other" than theory.
I think Theory vs. theory is a canard. A distinction with little difference.
The ability to think systematically does not define a theoretician- like the earlier example, doctors must think systematically, but they are not theorists. Nor can they be - the role cannot allow it.
I grant the term "T/theory" is generalized, but also bastardized - there is the saying "the plural of anecdote is not data" - observations and impressions are very different from theorizing.
The mix of linguistic theory merging with a left economic perspective and the crucial role of capital/culture, mixed in with (finally) a less obscure understanding of Lacan and post-Jung psychology is a powerful amalgam. Those that have tried to make this a Theory have failed so far, but the remains are productive to say the least.
The problem with cultural/consumer criticism is that everyone is a critic and everyone is expert on their own consumption. There is this (forgive the old-school terminology) anal compulsion to handles one's object a in public view in almost a celebratory fashion - which is NOT theory, but neurosis - an attempt to deal with the intense fragmentation and alienation in the world. The result is an infantile public, but without a real father - so various inadequate symbologies are provided and re/produced as required.
I think there is this third profession provided in academia today - the earlier theorist/pragmatist split has given way to a new vocation - the "critic" - whose profession is to show others how to consume more "critically" and thereby cope as late-capital continues its fall. This profession rejects "Theory" but embraces "theory" - the legitimacy offered is necessary to get work.
Scott, I think PEbird, if I'm not mistaken, is referring to something like Zizek's ideological analysis of objects in his final paragraph, or even Baudrillard's _System of Objects_... When Zizek, for instance, analyzes a film he's raising questions of the jouissance embodied in our consumption of the film and how it ties us to broader ideological mechanisms. If this is what PEbird is up to, I'd say there's a good deal of this on the market.
Scott,
"I wouldn't...except that's what it's called. I treat this in an instituional and material context, i.e. the fact that there’s a Critical Theory Institute and Critical Theory Emphasis at Irvine, at which people claim to "do Theory," and that the people who claim to do "do Theory" consider it a discrete body of knowledge that they can study through the courses offered by the CTI and CTE, &c."
Have you explicitly seen such people claim this? Isn't this granting more consistency to the Other or symbolic order than it itself has (mirroring your quest for a consistent Derrideanism)? Or, in Zizek's terms, isn't criticial theory a bit like the Egyptian pyramids where the mysteries of the pyramids were mysteries of the Egyptians themselves and where what critical theory is, is a mystery to critical theorists?
The faculty there is extremely diverse-- http://www.humanities.uci.edu/critical/html/People/members.html
--comprising marxists, historicists, deconstructionists, postmodernists, psychoanalysts, etc. This is also reflected in their publications:
http://sun3.lib.uci.edu/~scctr/cti.html
Given such a wide diversity in theoretical orientations, and all the inevitable struggle and dispute that emerges from such competing positions, it's difficult to plausably suggest that any practioners of something such as "Theory" believe that it's a single unified body of knowledge. Once again, it's very difficult for me not to see reactionary rhetoric at work in claiming that what one does *isn't theory*. This book comes to mind as an exemplification of this sort of thinking:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0231134177/sr=1-2/qid=1156367950/ref=sr_1_2/104-3845148-9812742?ie=UTF8&s=books
Grrr. The book is _Theories Empire_ edited by Patai and Corral
You're right about Zizek, though I'm not sure why this is so. From a psychoanalytic perspective, being marginalized isn't all bad as it means that you're occupying the position of the unconscious. Psychoanalytic theorists have always been proud of belonging to a "ghetto science" as this is taken as a mark of truth or that something real is being hit. Nonetheless, it's certainly not pleasant from an employment standpoint. I'm amazed I was able to get a job at all, having focused on contemporary French theory and coming out of a philosophy department (rather than lit or language)... It's extremely difficult to get a position in philosophy if you do French philosophy, especially if you do Deleuze, and especially if you do Deleuze's early work such as _Difference and Repetition_ and are concerned primarily with metaphysics and epistemology rather than trendy social and political topics.
Despite that, Zizek aside, I think there are plenty of people thriving and doing work in cultural studies and pop cultural analysis, who can be found in sociology departments, rhetoric departments, english departments, language departments, etc. There are conferences and journals for such topics all over the place.
Scott, I had the pleasure of taking classes with Mark Poster 30-odd years ago at Irvine, the Critical Theory department was just being organized at that point. I wish I could say I participated in its development, but I had to get a job and there went my career in Theory.
I also had the opportunity to work with Stanley Aronowitz at Irvine - can you imagine him in Orange County? You may also recall him as one of the editors in the Social Text collective - they were hoaxed by Professor Sokol of NYU around 1995 just around this Theory/theory kind of thing. Sokol was completely unethical in his behavior and was a harbinger for a number of reactionary activities - all in the name of bringing clarity to left-ish thinking.
So, I am a little touchy around the "Theory" thing. Just like the Higher Eclectism criticism of Holbo. The impression given is that if you just mix up a few ideas and drop some names, you are going to get some gig in some liberal arts college. No, you won't. It sounds like some idea Horowitz would want to perpetuate.
Now, the majority of graduate students in any discipline are not going to become professors. Sorry, but that is the math. Guess what, most are clueless anyway. They are insecure and so are reduced to dropping names and making insignificant connections and writing dreck. It is the same in Physics and Engineering and Biology. Remember cold fusion? So "Theory" is really "Crap", but it sounds better to say "I am doing Theory, than "I don't have a fucking clue". The answer to "I do Theory" is "No you don't, you must do praxis". Great fun at the English Department cocktail parties.
Almost all criticism of “Theory” could be leveled at any academic discipline - science requires a lot of false starts, dead ends and tedious activities resulting in a lot of boring unreadable, dense obscure work. Big deal. But that appears to be the basis of capitalizing the “t”, and thereby creating an enemy that must be destroyed.
My point about the rise of "the critic" is that there is a public need for understanding and analysis (not just at university), but without the fundamental critique that points out the need for revolutionary change. If you don’t see these characters running around academia as well as most commercial cultural enterprises you might want to broaden your view of the market.
You've mentioned work, the market and job requirements a few times; you might indeed be concerned about it and well you should be. As far as employment goes - if you want to get into advertising / marketing, believe it or not, cultural studies, psychology and yes even Zizek will get you in the door. Better pay and benefits than academia by far.
At least Scott has considered his position (no matter how strange and/or tenuous I find it). Have you ever come across people in the social sciences - especially sociology - who say their "methodology" is "grounded theory"? It seems, because they construct a lot of charts, tables and graphs, that they are immune from entering research with theoretical committments preffering, instead, to let the "theory emerge from the data" in the most vulgar and deductive understanding on the natural sciences! Strange, strange bunch. And they don't get it when you look at them like they're crazy.
Excellent point, Craig. I'm often amused when I talk to my colleagues in the social science and psychology, who seem to believe that somehow they're statistical studies "speak for themselves" and that the questions they ask in gathering this data doesn't already presuppose a conception of the social or of subjectivity.
Well in any case consider yourself duly added, sinthome, to The Page.
Thanks Matt!
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